Hitler on Topology

At this point, I’m sure everyone has seen at least one of the YouTube videos of Hitler ranting (actually actor Bruno Ganz from the movie Downfall) with fake subtitles. Here’s one showing Hitler’s reaction to discovering that in topology a set can be both closed and open. I think we all know how he felt. (This is the clip with accurate subtitles — I’d never seen it before.)

Via Cocktail Party Physics.

Shapley-Folkman-Starr Theorem

While economic theory sometimes uses advanced mathematics, such as Brouwer’s fixed point theorem, it’s less common for economic theory to lead to new mathematical developments. The Shapley-Folkman-Starr Theorem is an example of the latter. Roughly, the theorem states that the (Minkowski) sum of a large number of arbitrary sets in a finite-dimensional vector space will be close to convex. Starr was an economics undergraduate who was working on a term paper on approximating non-convex optimization problems with convex ones. This led to collaboration with Shapley (a game theorist), and Folkman (a mathematician), and the eponymous theorem.

Polytopes with Non-Rational Coordinates

Now that I have external evidence that someone is still hoping for new posts, I thought I better write one.

Here’s a result that not only would have I not have guessed, but I would have assumed the opposite is obviously true. There are convex polytopes that cannot be presented in Rn as a polytope all of with rational coordinates. I would have assumed that this is wrong because you can always take the vertices, and perturb them slightly so that they become rational. This argument doesn’t work in general, but you can prove using other techniques that in 3 dimensions that every convex polytope can be written with rational coordinates. There already exist counterexamples in dimension 4.

The survey paper Non-rational configurations, polytopes, and surfaces, by Günter M. Ziegler, gives an explicit construction in 13 dimensions. The paper provides a decent overview of many other, related, topics.

Axiom of Replacement in Category Theory

I had a slightly ironic experience on Math Overflow. A couple of months ago, I started wondering to what extent you could develop category theory “below a cardinal”. When you consider the category of groups (for example), you’re probably not literally interested in groups of arbitrarily large sizes — you just want enough space so that you can perform any operation you need to. I started writing this post here arguing that for concrete categories, sets smaller than a limit cardinal were big enough. Limit cardinals are not usually large cardinals in the sense of set theory, but they’re pretty big — the category of sets smaller than a limit cardinal is closed under the power set operation, for example.

Before I finished the post, I thought I should check the claim and look over some proofs in a category theory book. I realized that, under the usual definition of a diagram in the literature, my proposed restriction would make the category of sets fail to be either complete or cocomplete — even countable diagrams could have to have limits or colimits. You could finesse the issue by changing the definition of diagram, but I thought “No one will stand for that”. Under the standard definition, the construction of limits or colimits requires the Axiom of Replacement, which means that the right condition is inaccessibility, or equivalently you need Grothendieck universes.

So now I thought I understood the big picture. Completeness required replacement, which leads naturally to Groethendieck universes, which explains why the main competitor in textbooks to either Goedel-Bernays or Morse-Kelley set theory is to postulate one or more Grothendieck universes. The only thing that puzzled me was that while people using category theory seemingly made casual use of replacement, people would also argue that replacement is never used in ordinary mathematics. I thought that maybe I was confused on some issue, so I asked on Math Overflow.

It turns out that at least some people really don’t want to use replacement. They would rather change the definition of what it means to be a small diagram so as to be able to avoid the axiom. Avoiding replacement has lots of little consequences. For example, you have to require that the image of a small diagram is a set. Even with the corrected definition, the General Adjoint Functor Theorem becomes false as stated, and you have to strengthen the solution set condition. It means lots of fiddly little details have to be changed. You also no longer have as clean of a distinction between large and small. (You can have categories that are locally small, and have only countably many objects, and yet are not small categories, for example.)

But I could have stuck with my original idea for this post.

Reversible Markov Chains

Here’s a pretty idea. A Markov chain is one of the simplest forms of dependence in random variables: an infinite sequence of dependent random variables, where the probability distribution of the next random variable only depends on the value of the current random variable. If you reverse the sequence of variables, you get another Markov chain, the reverse Markov chain. Some Markov chains, reversible Markov chains, have the property that when you reverse them, you get back the same chain. Markov chains represent processes that have no history, in that future is determined solely by the present, not the past. A reversible Markov chain not only has no history, but time has no direction.

Here is a draft of a book by Aldous and Fill on the theory of reversible Markov chains.

The Algebra of Possibilities

There is a notion in symbolic dynamics of a “topological Markov chain” that is analogous to a Markov chain in probability theory. It’s occurred to me that you can extend the analogy to a complete analogy with probability theory. We’re still interested in sets of events, but now we’re no longer interested in the probability of an event, but just whether or not an event is possible.

Start with a σ-algebra of sets, as usual. Instead of associating a probability with each set, associate a member of the set {Not Possible, Possible}. The empty set is assigned the value Not Possible, while the whole space is assigned the value Possible. A countable disjoint union of sets is Possible if and only if at least one of the individual sets is Possible.

A measure takes values in the semigroup of the nonnegative real numbers closed under addition. Here, we’ve replaced that semigroup with the semigroup of {Not Possible, Possible} under the commutative binary operation +, with multiplication table:

+ Not Possible Possible
Not Possible Not Possible Possible
Possible Possible Possible

I’ll explain the relationship with topological Markov chains in a future post.

Martin Gardner and Hinton’s Cubes

Martin Gardner has just recently passed away. I remember really liking his books when I was in high school, but I haven’t looked at them since then.

One of his essays convinced me back in high school that trying to visualize the fourth dimension was dangerous. Charles Hinton invented a system of cubes to teach you to visualize the fourth dimension. Gardner printed a letter (copies at banubula and waggish) from someone who said that the cubes were bad for your mental health. It wasn’t until sometime after taking linear algebra that the feeling dissipated.

More on the cubes can be found at The Fairyland of Geometry.